Nicomachean Ethics
Aristotle
1,690 passages indexed from Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle) — Page 7 of 34
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Nicomachean Ethics, passage 168
For manifestly it is not health after this general and abstract fashion which is the subject of the physician’s investigation, but the health of Man, or rather perhaps of this or that man; for he has to heal individuals.—Thus much on these points.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 36
There is in Aristotle’s theory of human conduct no trace of Plato’s “other worldliness”, he brings the moral ideal in Bacon’s phrase down to “right earth”—and so closer to the facts and problems of actual human living. Turning from criticism of others he states his own positive view of Happiness, and, though he avowedly states it merely in outline his account is pregnant with significance.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 321
There are mean states likewise in feelings and matters concerning them. Shamefacedness, for instance, is no virtue, still a man is praised for being shamefaced: for in these too the one is denominated the man in the mean state, the other in the excess; the Dumbfoundered, for instance, who is overwhelmed with shame on all and any occasions: the man who is in the defect, _i.e._ who has no shame at all in his composition, is called Shameless: but the right character Shamefaced.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1336
But of Pleasure the whole nature is complete at any given moment: it is plain then that Pleasure and Movement must be different from one another, and that Pleasure belongs to the class of things whole and complete. And this might appear also from the impossibility of moving except in a definite time, whereas there is none with respect to the sensation of Pleasure, for what exists at the very present moment is a kind of “whole.”
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1317
And how can it be a Generation? because, according to notions generally held, not _any_thing is generated from _any_thing, but a thing resolves itself into that out of which it was generated: whereas of that of which Pleasure is a Generation Pain is a Destruction.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 776
For in all the habits which we have expressly mentioned, as likewise in all the others, there is, so to speak, a mark with his eye fixed on which the man who has Reason tightens or slacks his rope;[1] and there is a certain limit of those mean states which we say are in accordance with Right Reason, and lie between excess on the one hand and defect on the other.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1031
1. Some Pleasures of this class are actings of a low nature, whether congenital as in brutes, or acquired by custom as in low bad men.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1364
By choice-worthy in themselves are meant those from which nothing is sought beyond the act of Working: and of this kind are thought to be the actions according to Virtue, because doing what is noble and excellent is one of those things which are choice-worthy for their own sake alone.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1069
Rare it is probable Friendships of this kind will be, because men of this kind are rare. Besides, all requisite qualifications being presupposed, there is further required time and intimacy: for, as the proverb says, men cannot know one another “till they have eaten the requisite quantity of salt together;” nor can they in fact admit one another to intimacy, much less be friends, till each has appeared to the other and been proved to be a fit object of Friendship. They who speedily commence an interchange of friendly actions may be said to wish to be friends, but they are not so unless they are also proper objects of Friendship and mutually known to be such: that is to say, a desire for Friendship may arise quickly but not Friendship itself.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 597
This then is to be taken as our account of the various moral states which have Anger for their object-matter.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1245
Yet might such an one be judged to be more truly Self-loving: certainly he gives to himself the things which are most noble and most good, and gratifies that Principle of his nature which is most rightfully authoritative, and obeys it in everything: and just as that which possesses the highest authority is thought to constitute a Community or any other system, so also in the case of Man: and so he is most truly Self-loving who loves and gratifies this Principle.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 768
And, besides all this, a man cannot act Unjustly without his act falling under some particular crime; now a man cannot seduce his own wife, commit a burglary on his own premises, or steal his own property.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 213
Nor is this view again without its difficulties: for, after a man has lived in blessedness to old age and died accordingly, many changes may befall him in right of his descendants; some of them may be good and obtain positions in life accordant to their merits, others again quite the contrary: it is plain too that the descendants may at different intervals or grades stand in all manner of relations to the ancestors.[31] Absurd indeed would be the position that even the dead man is to change about with them and become at one time happy and at another miserable. Absurd however it is on the other hand that the affairs of the descendants should in no degree and during no time affect the ancestors.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 968
Well then, that Imperfection of Self-Control is not Confirmed Viciousness is plain: and yet perhaps it is such in a way, because in one sense it is contrary to moral choice and in another the result of it:[18] at all events, in respect of the actions, the case is much like what Demodocus said of the Miletians. “The people of Miletus are not fools, but they do just the kind of things that fools do;” and so they of Imperfect Self-Control are not unjust, but they do unjust acts.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 176
So then Happiness is manifestly something final and self-sufficient, being the end of all things which are and may be done.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 259
Now, that we are to act in accordance with Right Reason is a general maxim, and may for the present be taken for granted: we will speak of it hereafter, and say both what Right Reason is, and what are its relations to the other virtues.[4]
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 383
Further, Moral Choice is commended rather for having a right object than for being judicious, but Opinion for being formed in accordance with truth.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1676
[5]The Great man will have a right to look for more Friendship than he bestows, but the Good man _can_ feel Friendship only for, and in proportion to, the goodness of the other.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1665
The [Greek: akolastos] _deliberately_ pursues pleasure and declines pain if there is to be a distinct name for the latter phase, it comes under [Greek: malakia] more nearly than any other term, though perhaps not quite properly.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 177
But, it may be, to call Happiness the Chief Good is a mere truism, and what is wanted is some clearer account of its real nature. Now this object may be easily attained, when we have discovered what is the work of man; for as in the case of flute-player, statuary, or artisan of any kind, or, more generally, all who have any work or course of action, their Chief Good and Excellence is thought to reside in their work, so it would seem to be with man, if there is any work belonging to him.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1045
Again, where people are in Friendship Justice is not required;[1] but, on the other hand, though they are just they need Friendship in addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of Friendship.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1184
Well then, as has been said already, as a general rule the debt should be discharged, but if in a particular case the giving greatly preponderates as being either honourable or necessary, we must be swayed by these considerations: I mean, in some cases the requital of the obligation previously existing may not be equal; suppose, for instance, that the original benefactor has conferred a kindness on a good man, knowing him to be such, whereas this said good man has to repay it believing him to be a scoundrel.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 292
This of course is not one nor the same to all: for instance, suppose ten is too much and two too little, people take six for the absolute mean; because it exceeds the smaller sum by exactly as much as it is itself exceeded by the larger, and this mean is according to arithmetical proportion.[12]
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1330
An act of Sight is thought to be complete at any moment; that is to say, it lacks nothing the accession of which subsequently will complete its whole nature.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1415
The Lacedæmonian is nearly the only State in which the framer of the Constitution has made any provision, it would seem, respecting the food and manner of living of the people: in most States these points are entirely neglected, and each man lives just as he likes, ruling his wife and children Cyclops-Fashion.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1344
Again, a person may conclude that all men grasp at Pleasure, because all aim likewise at Life and Life is an act of Working, and every man works at and with those things which also he best likes; the musical man, for instance, works with his hearing at music; the studious man with his intellect at speculative questions, and so forth. And Pleasure perfects the acts of Working, and so Life after which men grasp.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 377
Nor is it Wish either, though appearing closely connected with it; because, in the first place, Moral Choice has not for its objects impossibilities, and if a man were to say he chose them he would be thought to be a fool; but Wish may have impossible things for its objects, immortality for instance.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 490
Well then, in the case of the desires which are strictly and properly natural few men go wrong and all in one direction, that is, on the side of too much: I mean, to eat and drink of such food as happens to be on the table till one is overfilled is exceeding in quantity the natural limit, since the natural desire is simply a supply of a real deficiency.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 881
Further: the man who is to have the Knowledge which comes through demonstration must not merely know and believe his principles better than he does his conclusion, but he must believe nothing more firmly than the contradictories of those principles out of which the contrary fallacy may be constructed: since he who _knows_, is to be simply and absolutely infallible.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 230
Now if it is to such objects that praise belongs, it is evident that what is applicable to the best objects is not praise, but something higher and better: which is plain matter of fact, for not only do we call the gods blessed and happy, but of men also we pronounce those blessed who most nearly resemble the gods.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 619
Now as the ridiculous lies on the surface, and the majority of men take more pleasure than they ought in Jocularity and Jesting, the Buffoons too get this name of Easy Pleasantry, as if refined and gentlemanlike; but that they differ from these, and considerably too, is plain from what has been said.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1276
Perhaps then it is well not to endeavour to have very many friends but so many as are enough for intimacy: because, in fact, it would seem not to be possible to be very much a friend to many at the same time: and, for the same reason, not to be in love with many objects at the same time: love being a kind of excessive Friendship which implies but one object: and all strong emotions must be limited in the number towards whom they are felt.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 858
Now it is Virtue which makes the Moral Choice right, but whatever is naturally required to carry out that Choice comes under the province not of Virtue but of a different faculty. We must halt, as it were, awhile, and speak more clearly on these points.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1646
[1] The account of Virtue and Vice hitherto given represents rather what men _may be_ than what they _are_. In this book we take a practical view of Virtue and Vice, in their ordinary, every day development.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1147
There are then, as was stated at the commencement of this book, three kinds of Friendship, and in each there may be friends on a footing of equality and friends in the relation of superior and inferior; we find, I mean, that people who are alike in goodness, become friends, and better with worse, and so also pleasant people; again, because of advantage people are friends, either balancing exactly their mutual profitableness or differing from one another herein. Well then, those who are equal should in right of this equality be equalised also by the degree of their Friendship and the other points, and those who are on a footing of inequality by rendering Friendship in proportion to the superiority of the other party.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 308
II. In respect of pleasures and pains (but not all, and perhaps fewer pains than pleasures):
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 382
Again, we choose to take or avoid, and so on, but we opine what a thing is, or for what it is serviceable, or how; but we do not opine to take or avoid.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 718
And so there is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract Unjust, and the just act and the abstract Just: I mean, a thing is unjust in itself, by nature or by ordinance; well, when this has been embodied in act, there is an unjust act, but not till then, only some unjust thing.[24] And similarly of a just act.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1175
In cases where no stipulation as to the respective services is made they who disinterestedly do the first service will not raise the question (as we have said before), because it is the nature of Friendship, based on mutual goodness to be reference to the intention of the other, the intention being characteristic of the true friend and of goodness.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1444
The major premisses may be stored up in the mind as rules of action, and this is what is commonly meant by having principles good or bad.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 835
Again, one man may hit on a thing after long deliberation, another quickly. And so that before described will not be yet Good Counsel, but the Rightness must be with reference to what is expedient; and you must have a proper end in view, pursue it in a right manner and right time.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 534
There are some people whose motive, either supposed or alleged, for keeping their property is this, that they may never be driven to do anything dishonourable: to this class belongs the skinflint, and every one of similar character, so named from the excess of not-giving. Others again decline to receive their neighbour’s goods from a motive of fear; their notion being that it is not easy to take other people’s things yourself without their taking yours: so they are content neither to receive nor give.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 804
For the Principles of the matters of moral action are the final cause of them:[19] now to the man who has been corrupted by reason of pleasure or pain the Principle immediately becomes obscured, nor does he see that it is his duty to choose and act in each instance with a view to this final cause and by reason of it: for viciousness has a tendency to destroy the moral Principle: and so Practical Wisdom must be “a state conjoined with reason, true, having human good for its object, and apt to do.”
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 609
It is possible of course to take any of these lines either with or without some further view: but in general men speak, and act, and live, each according to his particular character and disposition, unless indeed a man is acting from any special motive.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 323
But for the discussion of these also there will be another opportunity, as of Justice too, because the term is used in more senses than one. So after this we will go accurately into each and say how they are mean states: and in like manner also with respect to the Intellectual Excellences.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1196
To put another case: suppose that one party remains what he was when the Friendship was formed, while the other becomes morally improved and widely different from his friend in goodness; is the improved character to treat the other as a friend?
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 245
But of Reason this too does evidently partake, as we have said: for instance, in the man of self-control it obeys Reason: and perhaps in the man of perfected self-mastery,[43] or the brave man, it is yet more obedient; in them it agrees entirely with the Reason.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1521
[7] The meaning is, that the _onus probandi_ is thrown upon the person who maintains the distinction, Aristotle has a _prima facie_ case. The whole passage is one of difficulty. Card wells text gives the passage from [Greek: dokei de] as a separate argument Bekker’s seems to intend al 81 ir/jd£eis as a separate argument but if so, the argument would be a mere _petitio principii_. I have adopted Cardwell’s reading in part, but retain the comma at [Greek: dmpho] and have translated the last four words as applying to the whole discussion, whereas Cardwell’s reading seems to restrict them to the last argument.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 1597
But [Greek: nous] tells me that the term Magnets is coextensive with the term A B C, therefore of all Magnets I may predicate that they attract iron.
Nicomachean Ethics, passage 923
Now that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of men of Self-Control and of Endurance, and also of men of Imperfect Self-Control and Softness, is plain.